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Abstract
The architecture of educational buildings is required to meet the contemporary 
needs and follow regulations concerning safety issues in an intelligent, resilient, and 
systematic manner. However, the current literature generally neglects to identify 
geo-referenced risks within GIS environment based on the users’ perceptions of edu-
cational environments. This research aims to present a newly formulated risk evalu-
ation criteria for assessing the spaces within and outside educational buildings. This 
chapter investigates students’ experience of using different micro-spaces, architects’ 
predesign assumptions and expectations of the spaces, and post-design assessment 
of the spaces. Two case studies of educational spaces within University of New South 
Wales campus in Kensington, Sydney was selected, and the questionnaire method 
was employed to collect data from students, who routinely use the selected areas. By 
comparing the results of the two buildings and mapping them in GIS, it is suggested 
that feelings of safety and security can be increased via improving the building fea-
tures and enhancing the building control and security control, for example, install-
ing CCTV and other security infrastructure. Data-driven findings mapped into GIS 
create a prototype for the identification of problematic areas on a map. The results 
help decision-makers to understand risks and strengthen risk reduction strategies. 
This work is also a step towards smarter buildings and enhanced preparedness for an 
effective response to a security threat, both minimal and extreme.
Keywords: smart cities, resilient cities, safe buildings, public building, GIS
1. Introduction
Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is an established 
design methodology that aims to reduce the opportunity for crime, fear, and 
disorder within the built environment. Pioneered by US architect Randall Atlas, this 
method for designing recognises the intended use of a space in a building and the 
opportunity to use design elements to achieve security goals without the imposition 
of traditional security mechanisms (e.g. alarms, gates, and locks). It is important 
to note that this method can be applied not only to new design projects but also ret-
roactively for existing sites [1]. The CPTED establishes a framework for assessing a 
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program or building, aiming to consider and classify assets, threats, vulnerabilities, 
and countermeasures, working to establish the security needs and requirements 
of a site. Through this site assessment, architects and designers should be able to 
follow guidelines that ensure the safety of clients and users from a range of security 
threats, from basic petty crime to more extreme terrorist attacks [1].
However, this design methodology is a general guideline and does not provide 
specific, analysed case studies nor those showing a mapping of how crime and 
unsafe areas are linked to user perception. This study aims to provide a methodol-
ogy for mapping an area or location and addresses questions of perceptions of 
safety in a public, educational environment. The first question aims to identify 
whether a student feels safer in an outside public space in front of the building or 
inside the building. What are the factors that would make one access feel safer than 
another? Do students feel safer if they are more visible by other students and by 
staff members (directly or indirectly through closed-circuit TV or CCTV cameras)? 
Outside the building, it is assumed that students have clear vision of the surround-
ing areas and have the possibility to take different paths if they notice something 
unusual in the area. The interior of the building could be perceived as more pro-
tected, but it is more constraining and generally more difficult to locate a safe space 
when faced with a threat inside a largely open-plan public building.
Within the interior of the ground floor, what are the factors that would make 
one location feel safer than another? Considering the factors that might influence 
the response of students (e.g. gender, time of day or night studying, cultural back-
ground, familiarity with area), is it possible to have a map that represents the feel-
ing of safety of the community of users of a building? If yes, what is the accuracy 
of this map? This study will provide guidelines to help designers and stakeholders 
in evaluating the perception of safety of the users of their public buildings and also 
assist them to identify areas in a public building where the perception of safety is 
low, in order to enhance the well-being of the users.
2. Literature review
This section reviews relevant papers in three main areas to develop an interdis-
ciplinary framework to be a base for conducting a systematic survey. Three main 
areas are selected, and relevant papers are reviewed as follows.
2.1 Resiliency in public buildings and international frameworks
Safety and security in public buildings is a considerable phenomenon that has 
been widely debated. The aim is to anticipate hazards in order to alter the frequency 
and intensity of hazards and disasters within public buildings. This can affect 
considerably built-up, urban environments, particularly public buildings such as 
university campuses (Basher, 2006; Tozier de la Poterie and Baudoin, 2015). Disaster 
risk management studies have focused on natural disaster risks such as fire, floods, 
and storms, when man-made disasters such as a terrorist attack have been neglected. 
Using a review of existing literature, this study explores international frameworks 
for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resiliency enhancement in public buildings. 
Methods exist to significantly reduce the number of disaster risks and loss of life, 
livelihood, and health in the economic, physical, social, cultural, and environmental 
assets of persons, businesses, communities, and countries [2]. International frame-
works for disaster risk reduction and resiliency have very ambitious targets to reduce 
global hazard incidents in terms of the number of people affected globally and direct 
disaster economic loss in Gross Domestic Product and the number of countries with 
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high national and local disaster risk [2]. Hence, this research will review disaster 
risk reduction and building resiliency associated with safety and security within the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR), analysing how 
public buildings such as university campuses are addressed.
In Australia, local councils are responsible for approving the development of 
most projects and building plans [2–4]. They are important for reducing risk in 
planning and building; they must pass bylaws on building regulations and prepare 
land use plans and emergency response plans. This research seeks to measure public 
buildings’ approaches and synergies with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030. Local councils have emphasised the need to focus on urban 
resilience; however, there have been insufficient tools and techniques to measure 
public buildings’ resilience efforts with clear quantitative decision-making tools [5].
There are four main priorities explained in the Sendai Framework. These follow-
ing priorities are split into national/local levels and global/regional levels. It enables 
effective macro- and micromanagement to tailor towards different areas:
Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk.
Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.
Priority 3: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience.
Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build 
Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
These priorities of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction are the 
background framework of this chapter investigating a connection between safety in 
building and resilience.
2.2 Safety-oriented design
Resilience in the case of a university building means that the design is keeping users 
and assets safe, and at the same time, users are not anxious in their everyday life by 
the safety-oriented design. The university building stays open and welcoming to staff, 
students, and temporary guests. Australia’s current counterterrorism guidelines focus 
on securing crowded places, and universities are considered in this category, especially 
during special events like open days.1 While the application of the guidelines to a 
particular site is informed by criteria set out in [6], the strategies adopted in specific 
cases—including the extent to which “openness-friendly” measures are adopted—rely 
on relevant design stakeholder engagement. The outcome of the literature review on 
safety-oriented design in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States2 is that 
two broad approaches to securing public spaces can be identified: enclosing and layering.
Enclosing, also known as “fortressing” (or “traditional target hardening”), is a 
defensive strategy that focusses predominantly on denying access to a target through 
exclusion. In its most elementary form, enclosing secures public domains via physical 
or artificial barrier techniques such as bollards and security walls ([1]: 5, 13). 
1 As of 29 June 2019, Australia’s ANZCTC has published 16 counterterrorism related guidelines and 
reports: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Pages/default.aspx
2 As of 29 June 2019:
• 13 counterterrorism related guidelines and reports have been published in the US (FEMA website). 
Those of most relevance to the present discussion are those published by Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA): FEMA 426 Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings [7] and FEMA 430 Site and Urban Design for Security [8].
• 25 counterterrorism related guidelines and reports have been published in the UK (gov.uk website). 
The CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure) issues guidelines for important and 
sensitive assets (CPNI website). Those of most relevance to the present discussion are the guidelines 
issued by HM Government [9, 10] and by the Royal Institute of British Architects [11].
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Typically, the implementation of this design strategy sees significant standoff 
distances between entrance points and the building, facades constructed of hard-
ened materials, and the building’s interior protected by both secure outer and inner 
perimeters ([12]: 2.23).3
Enclosing has proved a common strategy under the US counterterrorism guide-
lines for many years, notably in the safeguarding of schools and college campuses.4 
While its implementation offers a very direct (and efficient) enhancement of 
safety, in design terms it poses significant challenges to maintaining physical and 
psychological openness. As Randall I. Atlas notes, “[c]onsider the 1970s fortressing 
in schools and the windowless and sterile physical structures that emerged. That 
fortressing sent a message of paranoia and fear” ([1], 283).
In contrast to enclosing, layering is a security strategy that focusses on protect-
ing a site by introducing multiple layers of complementary protective measures. 
The strategy capitalises on redundancy in a site’s security design: if implemented 
correctly, it ensures that the failure of any single layer—which may consist of 
different security measures—will not significantly compromise the overall security 
of the building. Rather than reducing the likelihood of a security threat, the goal 
of layered security is to reduce the likelihood of a successful threat. Also known as 
“security in depth” ([15], 14), strategies of layering consider a building’s security 
both in its proximate context and in its internal layout. Under the US counterterror-
ism guidelines, FEMA outlines a layered security comprising three layers:
• “First Layer of Defence”: comprises barriers (commonly at a property line or 
sidewalk/curb line) ([7], 2–12). In the context of HV mitigation in front of a 
building, this first layer may take the form of permanent or removable (but 
well-designed and integrated) bollards.
• “Second Layer of Defence”: extends from the perimeter of the site to the exte-
rior face of a building ([7], 2–12). “The most basic elements of architecture are 
themselves part of the security systems for buildings: walls, doors” ([16], 16).
• “Third Layer of Defence”: commonly comprises the building’s interior and 
separates unsecured from secured areas ([7], 2–12).
More nuanced a security strategy than the defensive “shield” of enclosing, 
layering—in principle—aligns more naturally with objectives of openness in public 
building security and thus with objective of resilient design.
2.3 Mapping of perception of safety
Existing research mainly focuses on crime mapping and safe zone mapping in 
public spaces. Crime mapping is one of the main purposes of recent crime analysis. 
However, the use of maps for criminology relates to predigital and satellite mapping 
techniques, when maps were 2D and containing less information.
Since the early 1980s, there has been a resurgence in the interest for three-
dimensional analysis of unsafe places and crime areas in order to identify high-risk 
areas and to visualise information on unsafe areas [17, 18]. When geographical 
information systems (GIS) were developed in the 1990s, policy makers, including 
law enforcement departments, started learning more about their capabilities. Policy 
3 Among others, the enclosing strategy has encouraged forms of perimeter protection such as ‘Forced-
Entry-Ballistic Resistant’ (FE-BR): see Whole Building Design Guide [13].
4 FEMA has published guidelines specifically in relation to school security [14].
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makers started learning the basics of location analysis and spatial information in 
order to identify and develop methodologies to prevent and protect public areas 
from crime.
The recent literature recommends the use of location-based systems and GIS to 
detect high-risk areas and the possibility of quick responses to the crimes [19, 20].
Emerging technologies such as advanced sensors, apps, and advanced GIS 
features are helpful for safety and crime analysis. Different layers of GIS can show 
the historical or current high-level crime areas and unsafe locations. Relevant data 
seeks to identify spatial patterns related to space, people activities, location fea-
tures, and time. However, the utilisation of such technologies now updated [21, 22] 
and the upscaling to advanced technologies is slow. Several unanswered questions 
are mentioned in the literature and are knowledge gaps such as [17, 21, 22] what 
methods such as univariate methods can be used to extrapolate location-based 
patterns in small public areas. Crime and safety location analysis and mapping 
demonstrate, measure, analyse risks, and evaluate or rate locations. The analysis 
also helps to interpret what should be done in high-risk areas, what should be the 
priorities, and what should be improved. Locating, mapping, and geo-referencing 
may reveal patterns that can be used to model space and time in predicted future 
situations [17, 20].
The development and utilisation of GIS for crime and safety analysis is a slow 
process. The literature gives a couple of reasons for such a slow process, such as the 
costs, hardware, and software available to public place managers, and the com-
plexity of the system development process [17, 23, 24]. However, it is known as a 
powerful tool to support crime and unsafe place analysis including the day-to-day 
activities of place users [23]. At the technical level, GIS uses vector data represent-
ing the fundamental units of spatial data such as points, lines, and polygons. The 
point is a discrete position similar to a pin or flag on a 2D drawing. The line also 
represents more than two points on a map which is the same as a normal line or a set 
of points in one line representing the boundaries and walls. The complicated feature 
can be a polygon representing a geographic area in the selected public building 
with a set of line segments [25]. Buildings, parks, or lakes are just a few examples. 
The GIS environment includes a series of elements corresponding to a data bit or 
a record which should be previously defined as an attribute. Figure 1 shows the 
proposed workflow to select the area, collect data, and populate the geodatabase for 
the safety and crime analysis in this paper.
Since the safety and crime analysis is a complicated analysis, the vector data is 
not enough for modelling and accurate interpretation. Therefore, the second type of 
data is required, namely, raster data model. Raster data is RGB or pixel-based data 
Figure 1. 
The proposed workflow for creating and updating the maps in GIS environment.
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such as an image. This type of data can be collected from different sources such as 
aerial or satellite photos. Similar to the vector data, the data record has an attribute; 
it means that each pixel linked to an attribute value. The combination of both vector 
and raster data sets will enrich the designed GIS model by including the qualitative 
data related to geographical data.
Since the public space is selected in an educational area, the literature in the 
education is also reviewed. The student feelings and attitudes that are obtained by 
a university’s environment can be called the university climate in terms of safety 
(Loukas, 2007). This is related to the concept of safety and safe learning environ-
ment. The quality of the physical environment and a safe university helps students 
to flourish socially and emotionally.
Previous studies focused on several factors influencing the safety climate in an 
education place (Loukas, 2007). However, details of the physical environment have 
been largely ignored. Furthermore, different zones in a large university have differ-
ent attributes, and the student’s feelings are not the same. A question has remained 
on what main factors potentially influence the university climate. Particularly, what 
characteristics may contribute more in making feeling higher safety in buildings by 
students (Table 1).
Previous studies explained that the quality of the educational building and 
infrastructure may affect the student achievement; additionally, this also could affect 
both students and teachers’ attitude towards learning and teaching, respectively. 
Many papers investigate the relationships between various building design types 
and features and students’ outcomes (Earthman, 2002, 2004; Higgins et al., 2005; 
Lemasters, 1997; Schneider, 2002, Buckley et al., 2004). For example, Buckley et al. 
(2004) suggests that the buildings’ shape affects the learning outcomes. As another 
example, Uline and Tschannen-Moran (2008) find that building age, climate control, 
indoor air quality, lighting, acoustical control, design classifications, and overall 
impression are key factors. While these studies make relationships between the 
level of safety and students achievements, they rarely provide detailed information 
of perceived safety from students’ points of view in the corners and other interior 
spaces of the educational buildings. Also, mapping the perceived safety for better 
identification of problematic areas within universities has remained scarce.
ID Variable References
SAF The level of safety in my study place [26, 27]
PVC The level of privacy in my study space [28, 29]
SPS Feel as safe in an enclosed more private study place [30, 26]
SRV You feel if your workspace wasn’t monitored by surveillance cameras [31, 32]
BUR Bollards potentially lowering the threat of unsafe reactions [33]
VAS Access influence, e.g. visibility, accessibility, or safety reasons [34]
COA affect your choice of access/circulation point [35]
BLA Building layout and architecture [36]
CRA Card readers/swipe card access [37, 38]
ASO Awareness and availability of the security office who monitor the security 
camera footage
[39]
AWH Awareness and availability of help points [40]
Table 1. 
A summary of key variables for conceptualization, Shirowzhan, S 2018.
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3. Research methodology
This paper is based on an empirical study on two selected educational buildings. 
A series of semi-structured questionnaires were designed based on the literature. 
The questionnaires assisted the researchers to translate the information given by the 
participants into maps and to evaluate the spaces at two relative local or global levels 
considering other spaces around the selected areas. A group of participants from 
each building was interviewed, and the results analysed. A comparison method 
was chosen to compare two selected educational building cases. The Red Centre 
and the Tyree Building are situated on the UNSW campus in Kensington, Sydney 
(See Figure 2). Both of these buildings allow data to be collated regarding safety, 
security, and defence at larger scale due to the size of each building. The buildings 
themselves are open to the public during the day (no swipe access at main entrances 
and to public parts at each level), and the boundaries are large glass facades on the 
ground floor. What protects these glass facades from a potential car/truck is a set 
of stairs between the University Mall and the interiors. The survey enables to make 
distinctions between both buildings.
As the appreciation of perception of safety on a scale from 1 to 5 is different for 
each person, we asked the students to compare one location with another. The infor-
mation about the differences of perception of safety from one location to another is 
more accurate than the absolute value itself for one location.
The comments added by the students in the semi-structured sections of the sur-
vey enable to appreciate the level of anxiety or well-being of the student better: two 
students defining the level of safety 3/5 might not have the same level of anxiety. 
The information in the textbox aims to highlight these differences.
To get a better understanding of the level of safety ranked by the students for 
the entries of the two buildings, we visualised the average perceived safety level for 
each entry in ArcGIS and for a better communication with users, and to enhance 
accessibility to the data, we visualised the GIS layer in Google Earth. To map these 
ranks, we considered a range of 5 to 1 for mapping feeling of safety where 5 demon-
strates feeling of distressed using the entry and 1 reveals feeling totally safe using 
the location as chosen entry.
Figure 2. 
Red centre and Tyree building at UNSW and the studied entrances in this research.
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4. Findings and discussion
Figures 3 and 4 show the feeling of unsafety, for Red Centre and Tyree 
Buildings entries in different day and night times.
Figures 3 and 4 show the average for each entry gate at different time. Figure 4 
shows that students perceptions in terms of safety for entry 3 (Tyree) are always the 
same, while entry 1 and 2 may not be safe sometime. Similarly, the same feeling at 
night time where some lighting facilities are available in front of the case building.
Figure 5 also shows that case 1 has received consistent scores which are average 
and high. However, the second case entries do not allow students to have a consistent 
safe feeling at different times, and they may need to change their choices of paths 
and entries. Based on the evaluation and the available data, the risk map was created 
indicating the main spots. Average level of safety is demonstrated in different colours in 
a map created in ArcGIS. The layer is exported into Google Earth, and as can be seen in 
Figure 6, the values of average safety for each entry can be seen and compared. Indeed, 
this kind of mapping can be used for identification of the problematic areas. In addi-
tion, it could be used as a safety base map for the security teams to enhance intervention 
activities or monitoring facilities for the entries identified to have lower levels of safety.
The facade design was a consistent comment across a number of the students 
also, suggesting that glass or transparent facades lead to more secure buildings/
increased feelings of security. The entrances/exits and circulation were also men-
tioned in responses from students, suggesting that the design of these has a major 
impact on the safety of these buildings (particularly in the RC which has a single 
main entrance/exit point).
The Tyree Building has greater variation across the locations, with Location 03 
(from back of building) generally regarded as the least safe option, particularly at 
night, and Location 02 (from University Mall) regarded as the safest at both times 
of day. Location 03 is regarded as least safe.
In terms of design we investigated that in Question 9f: Do you think the building 
layout and architecture (accesses, evaluation of facades, and close surroundings up 
to 200 meters) have an impact on the level of criminal acts and their nature? The 
interviewers state that: The configuration of spaces manipulates places for the human 
condition and consciousness to use it for their benefits. Criminals acts are not the only 
factor.” And also “the RC has a clear facade and so is quite open. There is also essentially 
1 entrance as well.” Or another participant clarifies that “the facade of the Red Centre 
building for the exhibition space and mezzanine are very visible so this may discourage 
criminal activity; however, the upper floors consist of long corridors and closed off areas 
may allow for more criminal activity. The concentration of major circulation routes and 
inefficiency of emergency exits may also encourage this type of activity.” And finally, 
“more advanced designs on facades makes building appear more safe and secure.”
Figure 3. 
Day and night time feeling of unsafety for red centre building.
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Figure 4. 
Day and night time feeling of unsafety for entrances of TYREE building.
Figure 5. 
The average score for each entry gate at night and daytime. Note to figure: Red refers to RC (case building 1) 
and Blue refers to TB (case building 2). The RC received scores above the median. The TB has received totally 
different scores for each entry.
Figure 6. 
Demonstration of the rate for a feeling of safety (AvrSafety value in the demonstrated attribute table on the 
map) for entry 1 of TYREE building.
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5. Conclusion and further research
This study aimed to develop a novel method for evaluating and demonstrating 
risk spots in an educational campus using geographical information systems. The 
study addressed the following key questions: Which student feels less safe than 
others, which entry is reported unsafe, and how is daytime safety perceived dif-
ferently than night time safety? The results show that the Red Centre building is 
generally regarded as safer than the Tyree Building, during both daytime and night. 
There are no major differences across both sites during the day; however, the major 
differences occur for the night rating. Findings indicate that students feel less safe 
working in the building than the RC work zones. It might be due to the proximity of 
the TB to the main road (Anzac Parade) and main walkways. One side of the TB is 
in line with the main road.
Across the two locations, the perception of safety in the RC is consistent dur-
ing both day and night; however, it was regarded to be slightly safer inside than 
external location. Across responses to the RC, students either responded with 1 or 5 
(extremes of safety or danger), with no responses landing in the middle; it suggests 
extreme feelings of comfortability on campus or the opposite. Location 01 regarded 
as most safe, and Location 03 regarded as least safe.
By comparing the results for the two buildings, it is suggested that the openness 
of buildings is valued by users to feel safe. Glass facades, when designed with safety 
glass, have a positive impact on the feeling of safety. Safety of university buildings 
can be achieved through access control coupled with the maintenance of visual links 
between interior and exterior of the building, i.e. symbolic openness.
The tools developed for this research enable to assist designers and stakeholders 
in the planning of university buildings. Safety-oriented design, based on the two 
main strategies of enclosing and layering, can be developed by stakeholders by con-
sidering the existing and future users’ feeling of safety. Design solutions coupling 
feeling of safety and architectural quality can be identified and then developed and 
reused in future projects.
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